Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) is pleased to recommend ratification of the treaties and protocols under consideration by the Committee today. We appreciate the Chairman’s actions in scheduling this hearing, and we strongly urge the Committee to reaffirm the United States’ historic opposition to double taxation by giving its full support as soon as possible to the pending Tax Treaty Protocol agreement with France and the New Zealand and Malta Tax Treaties and Protocols.

The NFTC, organized in 1914, is an association of some 300 U.S. business enterprises engaged in all aspects of international trade and investment. Our membership covers the full spectrum of industrial, commercial, financial, and service activities, and we seek to foster an environment in which U.S. companies can be dynamic and effective competitors in the international business arena. To achieve this goal, American businesses must be able to participate fully in business activities throughout the world through the export of goods, services, technology, and entertainment, and through direct investment in facilities abroad. As global competition grows ever more intense, it is vital to the health of U.S. enterprises and to their continuing ability to contribute to the U.S. economy that they are free from excessive foreign taxes or double taxation and impediments to the flow of capital that can serve as barriers to full participation in the international marketplace. Foreign trade is fundamental to the economic growth of U.S. companies. Tax treaties are a crucial component of the framework that is necessary to allow that growth and balanced competition.

This is why the NFTC has long supported the expansion and strengthening of the U.S. tax treaty network and why we recommend ratification of the Tax Protocol with France, and the Tax Treaties and Protocols with New Zealand and Malta.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TAX TREATY POLICY

While we are not aware of any opposition to the treaties under consideration, the NFTC, as it has done in the past as a general cautionary note, urges the Committee to reject any opposition to the agreements based on the presence or absence of a single provision. No process as complex as
the negotiation of a full-scale tax treaty will be able to produce an agreement that will completely satisfy every possible constituency, and no such result should be expected. Tax treaty relationships arise from difficult and sometimes delicate negotiations aimed at resolving conflicts between the tax laws and policies of the negotiating countries. The resulting compromises always reflect a series of concessions by both countries from their preferred positions. Recognizing this, but also cognizant of the vital role tax treaties play in creating a level playing field for enterprises engaged in international commerce, the NFTC believes that treaties should be evaluated on the basis of their overall effect. In other words, agreements should be judged on whether they encourage international flows of trade and investment between the United States and the other country. An agreement that meets this standard will provide the guidance enterprises need in planning for the future, provide nondiscriminatory treatment for U.S. traders and investors as compared to those of other countries, and meet an appropriate level of acceptability in comparison with the preferred U.S. position and expressed goals of the business community.

Comparisons of a particular treaty’s provisions with the U.S. Model or with other treaties do not provide an appropriate basis for analyzing a treaty’s value. U.S. negotiators are to be applauded for achieving agreements that reflect as well as these treaties do the U.S. Model and the views of the U.S. business community.

The NFTC wishes to emphasize how important treaties are in creating, implementing, and preserving an international consensus on the desirability of avoiding double taxation, particularly with respect to transactions between related entities. The tax laws of most countries impose withholding taxes, frequently at high rates, on payments of dividends, interest, and royalties to foreigners and treaties are the mechanism by which these taxes are lowered on a bilateral basis. If U.S. enterprises cannot enjoy the reduced foreign withholding rates offered by a tax treaty, noncreditable high levels of foreign withholding tax leave them at a competitive disadvantage relative to traders and investors from other countries that do enjoy the treaty benefits of reduced withholding taxes. Tax treaties serve to prevent this barrier to U.S. participation in international commerce.

If U.S. businesses are going to maintain a competitive position around the world, treaty policy should prevent multiple or excessive levels of foreign tax on cross border investments, particularly if their competitors already enjoy that advantage. The United States has lagged behind other developed countries in eliminating this withholding tax and leveling the playing field for cross-border investment. The European Union (EU) eliminated the tax on intra-EU, parent-subsidiary dividends over a decade ago, and dozens of bilateral treaties between foreign countries have also followed that route. The majority of OECD countries now have bilateral treaties in place that provide for a zero rate on parent-subsidiary dividends.

Tax treaties also provide other features that are vital to the competitive position of U.S. businesses. For example, by prescribing internationally agreed thresholds for the imposition of taxation by foreign countries on inbound investment, and by requiring foreign tax laws to be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to U.S. enterprises, treaties offer a significant measure of certainty to potential investors. Another extremely important benefit which is available exclusively under tax treaties is the mutual agreement procedure. This bilateral administrative mechanism avoids double taxation on cross-border transactions.
The NFTC also wishes to reaffirm its support for the existing procedure by which Treasury consults on a regular basis with this Committee, the tax-writing Committees, and the appropriate Congressional staffs concerning tax treaty issues and negotiations and the interaction between treaties and developing tax legislation. We encourage all participants in such consultations to give them a high priority. We also commend this Committee for scheduling tax treaty hearings so soon after receiving the agreements from the Executive Branch. Doing so enables improvements in the treaty network to enter into effect as quickly as possible.

We would also like to reaffirm our view, frequently voiced in the past, that Congress should avoid occasions of overriding the U.S. tax treaty commitments that are approved by this Committee by subsequent domestic legislation. We believe that consultation, negotiation, and mutual agreement upon changes, rather than unilateral legislative abrogation of treaty commitments, better supports the mutual goals of treaty partners.

AGREEMENTS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

The French Protocol and the New Zealand Tax Treaty that are before the committee today update agreements between the U.S. and these countries that were signed many years ago. The Malta Tax Treaty is a new treaty. The protocols improve conventions that have stimulated increased investment, greater transparency, and a stronger economic relationship between our countries. The NFTC has consistently urged adjustment of U.S. treaty policies to allow for a zero withholding rate on related-entity dividends. We are pleased that the New Zealand Protocol provides for the elimination of source-country taxation on interest. We do believe that the Malta and France agreements make an important contribution toward improving the economic competitiveness of U.S. companies, by lowering the current withholding rates on dividends. We thank the committee for its prior support of this evolution in U.S. tax treaty policy, and we strongly urge you to continue that support by approving all three of these Tax Treaties and Protocols.

The NFTC has also consistently urged adjustment of U.S. treaty policies to allow for a zero withholding rate on cross-border royalty payments. Only the French Protocol provides for zero withholding on royalties. The French Protocol reduces the withholding tax on royalties to zero, eliminating a long-standing barrier to cross-border licenses of intellectual property. This provision is vital in bringing the U.S.-French tax treaty into line with most of the other treaties the United States has entered into with developed countries.

The Malta treaty provides that royalties arising in a treaty country and beneficially owned by a resident of the other treaty country may be subject to a source country tax of up to 10 percent of the gross amount of the royalties. Such source-country taxation is not consistent with the exclusive residence country taxation provisions for royalties in both the U.S. and OECD Model treaties. This provision is an exception to U.S. tax treaty policy and practice, and has been included in only a handful of U.S. tax treaties with developing countries. The NFTC understands that the U.S. Treasury Department must negotiate with developing countries differently than with developed countries, but we hope that the Treasury position for future negotiations follows the U.S. Model Treaty, and that the Malta treaty not serve as a precedent in future treaty negotiations.
Additionally, important safeguards included in these protocols prevent “treaty shopping”. In order to qualify for the reduced rates specified by the treaties, companies must meet certain requirements so that foreigners whose governments have not negotiated a tax treaty with France, Malta, Malta or the U.S. cannot free-ride on this treaty. Similarly, provisions in the sections on dividends, interest, and royalties prevent arrangements by which a U.S. company is used as a conduit to do the same. Extensive provisions in the treaties are intended to ensure that the benefits of the treaty accrue only to those for which they are intended. All three of the Tax Treaties and Protocols contain good limitations on benefits provisions.

The French Protocol provides for mandatory arbitration of certain cases that cannot be resolved by the competent authorities within a specified period of time. Following the arbitration provisions already adopted in the Canadian, German and Belgian tax treaties, the arbitration provision included in the French Protocol will help to resolve cases where the competent authorities are unable to reach agreement. NFTC member companies view tax treaty arbitration as a tool to strengthen, not replace, the existing treaty dispute resolution procedures conducted by the competent authorities. The existing mutual agreement procedures work well to resolve most of the disputes that arise in cases involving France and the United States. The inclusion of the arbitration provisions in the French Tax Protocol will greatly facilitate the mutual agreement procedures in all competent authority cases.

IN CONCLUSION

Finally, the NFTC is grateful to the Chairman and the Members of the Committee for giving international economic relations prominence in the Committee’s agenda, particularly when the demands upon the Committee’s time are so pressing. We would also like to express our appreciation for the efforts of both Majority and Minority staff which have enabled this hearing to be held at this time.

We urge the Committee to proceed with ratification of these important agreements as expeditiously as possible.